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Toward Principles of Jury Equity
The fairness of a system of laws may be evaluated by its ability to
provide both justice and equity. Justice exists to the extent that per-
sons conform their actions to the universally applied, general expecta-
tions of behavior promulgated by the legal system, while equity de-
mands sufficient flexibility of application to permit these general ex-
pectations to adapt to the unique circumstances of individual cases.
This tension between justice and equity as two aspects of a single legal
system was discussed as early as Aristotle." And at least two crucial de-
velopments in the evolution of the English legal system-the use of
king's courts before the middle of the thirteenth century,2 and of the
1. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics 141 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962):
What causes the problem is that the equitable is not just in the legal sense of
"just" but as a corrective of what is legally just. The reason is that all law is
universal, but there are some things about which it is not possible to speak
correctly in universal terms. Now, in situations where it is necessary to speak in
universal terms but impossible to do so correctly, the law takes the majority of
cases, fully realizing in what respect it misses the mark. The law itself is none
the less correct. For the mistake lies neither in the law nor in the lawgiver, but
in the nature of the case.
See also Chroust, Aristotle's Conception of Equity, 18 NOTRE DAME LAw. 119 (1942).
Considerations of "equity," defined by Aristotle as justice in the individual case, would
require the decisionmaker to depart from the general law in these special cases; cf.
H. M cCLINTOcK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 1 (2d ed. 1948), which de-
fines equity as "the' power to meet the moral standards of justice in a particular case
by a tribunal having discretion to mitigate the rigidity of the application of strict
rules of law so as to adapt the relief to the circumstances of the particular case."
2. Until England developed a nation-wide legal system at the end of the twelfth
century, justice was administered by various local courts. W. WALSH, A TREATISE ON
EQurry 2 (1930). These were the courts of the hundred and the shire during the
Saxon period and the courts of the manor and the county in early Norman times.
The king, however, as the source of all justice, could intervene as a matter of grace
in any local case and remove the proceeding to the king's court or council. Id. at
1-2. See also H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 1, at 34. Thus, a dissatisfied local litigant
who could persuade the king of the righteousness of his case had recourse to a
settlement according to the king's conscience and reason. As a national court system
was established under Henry II, the power to issue writs granting a litigant's request
to have his case heard in the national or king's courts was delegated to the king's
Chancellor. G. BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 6 (11th ed. 1931). These writs
gradually became a matter of right rather than royal favor and the decisions of the
king's courts marked the beginning of the common law. From the middle of the
thirteenth century, however, these common law courts began to lose their discretionary
powers and the types of writs which could be granted as well as the remedies avail-
able to the courts became institutionalized. By the middle of the fourteenth century,
the concern for justice in the individual case which had given rise to the king's courts
had been transformed into a rigid system of general law. See G. BISPHAM, supra at
6-8. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 1, at 4; W. WALSH, supra at 8. See also Adams, The
Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUNf. L. REV. 87, 98 (1916); Barbour, Some Aspects
of Fifteenth Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REv. 834, 859 (1918).
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Chancery in the fifteenth century3-centered on the struggle between
general principles of law and individualized justice or equity.
In our present system, some argue that the jury's role is to adapt the
general law to the circumstances of the particular case. 4 Other commen-
tators disagree, charging that a jury relies on unbridled prejudice and
accidental feelings rather than on acceptable community notions of
fairness.5 At stake are important questions of limiting or expanding
the role of juries and of judges' instructions. Social psychological,
theory presents a model which helps put the debate in perspective and
defines the empirical data needed for intelligent resolution of the
issues.
3. As the common law courts became inadequate to meet the demands of special
cases, for redress litigants once again petitioned the king as the source of justice.
These petitions were referred to the Chancellor and came to be addressed directly to
him. See G. BIsPHAM, supra note 2, at 7; H. McCLINTOCK, supra note 1, at 5; W. WALSH,
supra note 2, at 12, 15. The Chancellor's court during the fourteenth century ac-
cepted only those petitions in which the remedy at common law was thought to be
inadequate. F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 5-6 (2d ed. 1936). The Chancellor relied on his con-
science, morality, and "natural justice" in fashioning relief, adapting his remedy to
the special circumstances of each individual case. G. BISPHAMI 9; H. MCCLINTOCK 6;
,V. WALSH 18, 25, 41.
Like the common law courts before them, the courts of Chancery, criticized for
lack of predictability and abuse of discretion, felt pressures for institutionalization.
By the eighteenth century it could be said that courts of Chancery or equity con-
stituted a distinct legal system which emphasized general principles and exercised a
substantive jurisdiction distinct from the common law courts. Although the principles
and precedents of equity are often more adaptable to special cases than is the common
law, see Lord Eldon's opinion in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670
(1818), courts of Chancery or equity have lost much of their value as correctives of
the general law in particular cases. See F. MAITLAND, supra at 9-11; R. NEWMAN, EQurY
AND LAw: A COMiPARATIVE STUDY 9-13 (1961); W. WALSH 17, 41-43. See also Hohfeld,
The Relations between Equity and Law, 11 MICH. L. REv. 537 (1923).
4. For example, Wigmore writes:
Law and Justice are from time to time inevitably in conflict. That is because
law is a general rule (even the stated exceptions to the rules are general ex-
ceptions); while justice is the fairness of this precise case under all its circumstances
* * **Now this is where the jury comes in. The jury, in the privacy of its
retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the justice of the particular case ....
It supplies that flexibility of legal rules which is essential to justice and popular
contentment.
Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. Azf. JUD. Soc'Y 166, 170 (1929).
5. See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAw AND THE" MODERN MIND 173-78 (1930); 0. HOL Ms, THE
COMMON LAW 126 (1881).
6. "Social psychology" is that section of the disciplines of sociology and psychology
concerned with the study of real or imagined personal relationships in a social context
as they affect behavior and attitudes of the individuals involved. See Allport, The
Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PsY-
CHOLOGY 3 (G. Lindzey ed. 1954).
7. This inquiry is restricted to "internal" fairness, that is, to the handling of
litigants once they have entered the system of justice. It does not deal with the
external or society-wide effects of the legal system in promoting justice. For such an
analysis from a social psychological perspective, see Macaulay & Walster, Legal Struc-
tures and Restoring Equity, 27 J. Soc. IssuEs 173 (1971).
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I. The Debate Over Jury Sovereignty
In 1670 Bushell's Case" established the right of a jury to find facts
and apply the law to those facts according to its conscience without
fear of judicial reprisal. In the United States, during the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, the jury was legally empowered to de-
cide both the facts and the law of a case in rendering its verdict.9 At
the end of the nineteenth century, however, feelings about the sover-
eignty of the jury had changed. Fearful of the law becoming "as vari-
able as the prejudices, the inclinations and the passions of men,"' 0
most jurisdictions significantly restricted the role of the jury, confin-
ing it to a determination of the facts alone." Today, the jury's proper
role in rendering its verdict is to determine the facts of the case and
to apply to those facts the law given it by the judge.' 2
In many cases, however, our legal system still gives the jury the
right to render a general verdict, to determine the amount of damages,
or to recommend sentence, and the jury, of course, may simply make
a finding of facts in favor of the party which it feels should prevail.' 3
8. 6 How. St. Tr. 999 (1670).
9. Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939). See, e.g.,
Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 1 (1794); Dean of St. Asaph's Case, 21 How. St.
Tr. 847 (K.B. 1783); remarks of Alexander Hamilton, quoted in J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF
NARRATION OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 78 (1963).
In criminal trials this gave rise to the jury's right of nullification, which implies
the right to set aside the instructions of the judge on the applicable law and to
reach a verdict of acquittal based upon the jury's own conscience and sense of fairness.
The right of nullification also implies the defendant's right to have the jury so in-
structed. See Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168
(1972).
10. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101 (1895), quoting G. WORTH-
INGTON, INQUIRY INTO THE POWER OF JURIES 193 (1825).
11. 156 U.S. at 101. See also United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (No. 15,815)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1851); United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (No. 14,545) (C.C.D. Mass.
1835); Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 11 So. 250 (1892); Commonwealth v. Parker, 10
Met. 263 (Mass. 1845).
The directed verdict, the special verdict, interrogation of juries, and the right of
the judge to comment on the evidence were also developed in the nineteenth century
as means of restricting the role of the jury. See Morgan, A Brief History of Special
Verdicts and Special Interrogatories, 32 YALE L.J. 575 (1923); Note, The Changing Role
of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170, 183-89 (1964).
12. Indiana and Maryland, however, still recognize the right of jury nullification
in criminal cases, Holliday v. State, 254 Ind. 85, 257 N.E.2d 679 (1970); Pritchard v.
State, 248 Ind. 566, 230 N.E.2d 416 (1967); Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 183 A.2d
359 (1962); Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 63 A.2d 599 (1949), and Kansas is considering
instructing its criminal juries accordingly. Scheflin, supra note 9, at 205-07. In addi-
tion, the constitutions of 24 states recognize the jury's right of nullification in criminal
or seditious libel cases. Id. at 204 & n.130.
13. Several writers contend that the jury's role in today's legal system is just as
powerful as it ever was, since its "power" to disregard the judge's instructions is
tantamount to a "right" to disregard them. J. FRANK, supra note 5, at 83-84; cf.
argument of Alexander Hamilton in People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 345 (N.Y.
1804). Some, in fact, maintain that our present system gives the jury more power
than ever before, since the attention which is devoted to the propriety of the judge's
legal instructions to the jury serves as a "great procedural opiate" by covering up
1025
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 83: 1023, 1974
In addition, the jury need not divulge the process by which it reached
its decision nor must it explain or account in any way for its verdict
to any authority.14 Thus the legal system gives to the jury the power,
if not the right, in reaching its verdict to refuse to follow the substan-
tive rules of law given it by the judge.15
The jury's sovereignty allows it to blunt the force of the general
law when this is required for the equitable0 resolution of a special
case. 7 Legal commentators disagree, however, about the desirability
of protecting the jury's power to disregard the judge's instructions and
take into account "extra-legal" factors in reaching its verdict. This
disagreement stems, in part, from conflicting views on how the jury
exercises its power.
A. Criticism of Jury Sovereignty
Critics of jury sovereignty emphasize the unpredictability of jury
discretion and stress the general incompetence and easy persuadability
of juries.' Judge Frank stressed the dysfunctional aspects of jury
sovereignty. He maintained that legislatures and the judiciary have
grown lax in revising outmoded rules because of their reliance on
juries to make such legal revision on their own in the jury room. This
leads, he observed, to an unfair lack of uniformity in decisions and to
an unpredictability in the law, since such "jury law" will change from
case to case and from jury to jury.'9
appeals to the jurors' emotions and biases and hiding incompetent or malicious
verdicts. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 61 & n.25d (2d Cir.
1948). See also G. CLEMENTSON, SPECIAL VERDICTS AND SPECIAL FINDINGS a3Y JURIES 12
(1905); J. FRANK 174; L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 351 (1930). Kalven and Zeisel found
that the juries they studied were often able to conduct their "revolt from the law
within the etiquette of resolving issues of fact." H. KALVEN & H. ZEIUEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 165 (1966); cf. Lord Devlin, who wryly noted, "I do not mean that they [the
jury] often deliberately disregard the law. But if they think it is too stringent, they
sometimes take a very merciful view of the facts." P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MORALS 21 (1959).
14. United State v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Bushell's Case,
6 How. St. Tr. 999 (1670).
15. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Skidmore v. Bal-
timore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1948). See also note 9 supra.
16. As used here, "equitable" means the conformity of particular decisions to the
so-called natural sense of fairness of the ordinary man based on commonly shared
moral principles. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 1, at 141-42; R. NEWMAN, supra note 3,
at 13-14.
17. See, e.g., note 4 supra. Several writers defend this role as the democratic analogue
to appealing to the king's conscience from the local English courts and later from
the common law courts, since in a democracy the "people," represented by the jury,
are sovereign. See R. NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 17; Scheflin, supra note 9, at 185-88.
18. See Hervey, The Jurors Look at Our Judges, 18 OKLA. STATE B.A.J. 1508 (1947);
Hoffman & Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. REv. 235 (1952); Hunter, Law in the
Jury Room, 2 OHIO STATE L.J. 1 (1935).
19. J. FRANK, supra note 5, at 173-78; Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d at
54 n.14.
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Other critics allege that the jury for the most part does not under-
stand the judge's instructions about the applicable law.20 Judge Frank2'
argued that it is impossfble to instruct 12 laymen in the intricacies of
legal doctrine through instructions which are so finely complicated
that many lawyers do not understand them."" Hunter 23 and Hervey 24
advanced evidence for this proposition in studies which found that
persons directed to act as jurors in a simulated trial situation ("simu-
lated jurors") often were not able to understand the legal instructions
given them. In addition, in a post-trial survey of actual jurors, Hoff-
man and Brodley2-0 report that many jurors either did not understand
or did not feel bound by the judge's instructions.
2 6
Redmount argues that the jury's verdict can be treated solely as a
product of persuasion.2 7 He analyzes the trial as a process of persuasion
and illustrates how fixed mental limits, emotional blocks, social biases,
prior persuasion, internal dispositions, confusion, and ignorance serve
as bases of juror decisionmaking. He feels that objective evidence pro-
20. See C. BOK, I, Too, NICODEMUS (1946); L. GREEN, supra note 13, at 351; Sunder-
land, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920).
21. Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d at 60, 64.
22. The reader may wish to contemplate a "model" set of first degree murder
instructions set forth in People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310 n.4, 411 P.2d 911 n.4, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 815 n.4 (1966).
23. Hunter, supra note 18.
24. Hervey, supra note 18.
25. Hoffman & Brodley, supra note 18. The early studies by Huhter, Hervey, and
Hoffman and Brodley, however, are open to criticism because of their use of small
samples and reliance on fairly crude methodology. For a more sophisticated empirical
study which provides evidence that the jury is in fact satisfactorily competent, see
Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1066-67 (1964).
26. An experiment reported by Broeder lends empirical support to the view that
instructions to the jury can have an unexpected impact. Using the experimental
juries of the Chicago Jury Project, he found that in civil cases where the simulated
jury was told that the defendant did not have liability insurance, the average amount
of damages awarded by the jury was S33,000. Where the jury was told that the de-
fendant did have insurance, the average award rose to $37,000. But in cases where
the jury learned that the defendant was insured but was instructed by the judge to
disregard the defendant's insurance coverage, the average award again rose to $46,000,
higher than either of the other two conditions. Broeder, The University of Chicago
Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 753-55 (1959).
Besides the "common sense" explanation that the judge's limiting instructions ex-
plicitly brought the defendant's insurance coverage to the jury's attention, the psy-
chological theory of "reactance" offers an explanation for the result. Reactance theory
maintains that men jealously guard their perceived freedom of action to such an
extent that in many situations, when that freedom is threatened (for example, by the
judge's instruction to disregard certain evidence), an individual will "react" to the
perceived threat by reasserting his freedom so much the more forcefully in the
threatened area. See J. BREHIM, A THRORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACrANCE (1966). If, in
fact, this is what occurs in a trial setting, the implications for trial practice and for
correction of objectionable statements made during the course of the trial are significant.
For support for the contrary view-that judges' instructions can have a strong in-
fluence on the jury's decisionmaking-see pp. 1048-50 & note 49 infra.
27. Redmount, Persuasion, Rules of Evidence and the Process of Trial, 4 LoyOL.w
U.L. REv. 253 (1971). See also Commentary, Persuasion in the Courtroom, 10 DUQUESNE
L. RE V. 384 (1972).
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duced at the trial and legally relevant criteria given by the judge must
compete disadvantageously with these other sources of persuasion in
influencing the jury's verdict. Many legal treatises, written by litigators
drawing on experiences in the courtroom, instruct lawyers how to select
a jury which will be biased in their favor and how to exploit these
legally irrelevant sources of persuasion.
2
8
Critics of jury sovereignty argue that juries, rather than ensuring
the fair application of general law in particular cases, are led by bias,
incompetence, and irrelevant persuasive factors to unpredictable and
capricious decisionmaking. Their position is based on the positivist"0
view that certainty and predictability are the hallmarks of a legal sys-
tem and that, without legal guidelines, ordinary people would be in-
fluenced by current prejudice rather than commonly shared notions
of natural justice or equity.
B. Support for Jury Sovereignty
Proponents of jury sovereignty, on the other hand, respect jury dis-
cretion as based on a moral sense of fairness which the jury shares
with the larger community. Wigmore30 and Pound 3' felt that "jury
lawlessness" kept the law in tune with community values and allowed
deviance when necessary from a general legal rule without entirely
abandoning it. Kalven admires the "jury equity" uncovered by his
empirical research 32 and argues that jury reform of outmoded laws
does not significantly impede legislative reform.3 3 Furthermore, cases
28. See H. BODIN, SELECTING A JURY (1966); H. GAIR, THE TRIAL OF A NEGLIGENCn
ACTION (1953); I. GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE (1935); R. HARRIS, HINTS ON ADVOCACY
(18th ed. 1943); L. LAKE, HOW TO WIN IN LAWSUITS BEFORE JURIES (1954); A. OSBORN,
THE MIND OF THE JUROR (1937); 2 L. SCHWARTZ, PROOF, PERSUASION, AND CROSS EXAMINATION
(1973). In addition, social scientists Jay Schulman and Richard Christie are currently
using social psychological techniques with remarkable success in the selection of jurors
on behalf of "political" defendants. TIME, Jan. 28, 1974, at 60.
29. Bentham illustrates the position of positivist jurisprudence. He argues that
without universal principles as a guide, people will make decisions on the basis of
arbitrary sympathies and antipathies, whatever they happen to approve being called
equitable and whatever they disapprove being called inequitable. Bentham views no-
tions such as "common sense," "natural law," "natural justice," and "natural
equity" as illusory inventions which rationalize arbitrary action and decisionmaking
based on subjective biases rather than rational principles. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 13643 (1948). See also Note,
supra note 11, at 179.
30. Wigmore, supra note 4.
31. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Ams. L. REV. 12 (1910).
32. Kalven, supra note 25, at 1075.
33. Id. at 1071. Kalven contends that laws are rarely sound or unsound as a whole,
requiring either application as is or outright legislative reform; the modifications
which juries make are usually slight and often too subtle to be codified. In addition,
he notes that courts occasionally respond to persistent jury resistance by using that
resistance as a reason for changing the law. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the
Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIo STATE L.J. 158 (1958). See, e.g., Vascoe v.
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such as Duncan v. Louisiana,34 Williams v. Florida,35 United States v.
Spockh3  and most recently United States v. Dougherty37 indicate that
the legal system itself acknowledges, with approval, that conscience
or shared notions of equity, rather than bias, incompetence, or tech-
niques of persuasion, are largely responsible for extra-legal jury deci-
sions.
Writers such as Wigmore, Pound, and Kalven, in defending jury
sovereignty, do not discuss the impact of general rules of law on the
jury's sense of fairness. One might almost assume from their respec-
tive discussions that whenever the law in the slightest regard does not
conform to the jury's sense of fairness in an individual case, the jury
abandons the rule of law in favor of an equitable result. Sanford and
Mortimer Kadish,38 however, argue that the jury gives a good deal of
tolerance to laws which it believes are not fair in a particular case be-
fore implementing its own sense of justice. They maintain that the
juror's role is so constructed that the rights and powers of the role may
conflict with one another.
This tension between the jury's rights and its powers emphasizes the
development of a significant justification for departures from general
rules of law. The juror is told of his legal obligation to follow the
judge's instructions, but the juror is also likely to be aware of his
sovereignty and of the ultimate end of his role-justice in the individ-
ual case.39 When the juror perceives these two expectations as being
in conflict (i.e., following the judge's instructions would not lead to
an equitable result), he will still feel obliged to follow the judge's in-
Ford, 212 Miss. 370, 54 So. 2d 541 (1951); cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 288 (1972).
Kalven stresses the importance of jury equity in shaping the development of formal
legal rules and notes that the jury's notion of equity is often the law in another
jurisdiction or a reform proposal receiving consideration. Kalven, supra at 168.
34. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Supreme Court stated that the jury's power to displace
law by appeal to conscience was a fundamental characteristic of the American system
of government. Id. at 156.
35. 399 U.S. 78 (1970). Justice White wrote for the Court: "The essential feature
of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of
the common-sense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participa-
tion and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or
innocence." Id. at 100.
36. 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). The court found that "the jury, as the conscience
of the community, must be permitted to look at more than logic" in reaching its
verdict. Id. at 182.
37. 473 F.2d 1113, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Chief Judge Bazelon, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, argues that jury nullification "can and should serve an im-
portant function in the criminal process," id. at 1141, and that a defendant should
have the right to have the jury told of its power of nullification. See also cases cited
in note 12 supra.
38. Kadish & Kadish, The Institutionalization of Conflict: Jury Acquittals, 27 J.
Soc. Issuas 199 (1971).
39. See Judge Leventhal's opinion in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113,
1135 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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structions unless the justification for disregarding those instructions
is sufficiently compelling to permit the juror to follow his own notions
of justice. Thus, the juror is expected to tolerate perceived inequity
in the application of general rules of law to the point where he feels
that the resulting inequity would be so great and so certain that his
departure from the general law is justified.40 This narrow right of
the jury is termed "legitimated interposition," and it is far different
from a right to disregard the law whenever the result of applying the
law seems inequitable.
The strongest empirical support for the proponents of the jury's
sense of justice, and in turn of jury sovereignty, comes from the most
thorough empirical study of the American jury to date, the Chicago
Jury Project. Kalven and Zeisel 41 collected judges' opinions of jury
performance in over 3,500 actual trials. The differences in outcomes
between judge and jury were small and suggested that the jury sub-
stantially agrees with the law's prescriptive norms. There were, how-
ever, several consistent differences. The jury interpreted the law of
self-defense more liberally than did the judge; 42 it was inclined to
evaluate the "contributory fault" of a victim in criminal cases;4 3 it
was reluctant to penalize what it felt were trivial offenses; 44 it hesitated
to enforce laws against so-called "crimes without victims" such as poach-
ing, public intoxication, gambling, and drunken driving;4 it was often
sympathetic to the defendant who was intoxicated at the time of his
alleged offense;4 6 and in reaching its verdict it took account of any co-
incidental suffering the defendant may have incurred during or as a
result of the crime.47 Kalven and Zeisel conclude that, although on the
whole the jury's "revolt" from the law is a minor one, the jury con-
sistently resists applying the substantive law in several areas, generally
because the laws are considered unfair or fail to make distinctions
deemed important by the jury.40 It is the consistency with which juries
were found to deviate from the law in certain areas that is important,
40. This notion of the juror's role builds into the system a tolerance for laws
which are just in most cases or which are only mildly unjust. Such tolerance is
very close to that put forward by Rawls in his explanation of an individual's duty
to comply with what he perceives to be an unjust law. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY Or
JuSTIcE 333-91 (1971).
41. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 13.
42. Id. at 229-31.
43. Id. at 243, 257.
44. Id. at 258-59.
45. Id. at 296-97.
46. Id. at 334-38.
47. Id. at 301-05.
48. Id. at 286, 493-95.
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since this suggests the influence of relatively stable notions of jury
equity.4
9
The key to the position of proponents of jury sovereignty is the ar-
gument that jurors, in departing from general law, rely on a shared5o
sense of justice which is accessible to the ordinary person.51 If this in-
dividual sense of equity in fact exists and is shared in roughly the same
form by members of a local community, then the fear of Judge Frank
and others5 2 that the jury's sovereignty leads to incompetence and un-
bridled discretion in decisionmaking should be greatly alleviated.
In sum, the occasionally conflicting expectations that our system of
justice act according to universal laws and yet bring about justice in
49. Another researcher involved with the Chicago Jury Project obtained evidence of
an additional dimension of jury equity. Using experimental techniques, Simon had a
set of subjects listen to tape-recorded, simulated trials, following procedures which re-
sembled as closely as possible those of an actual trial. She found that juries given the
"M'Naghten instruction," M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.
1843), on insanity were significantly less likely to acquit by reason of insanity than
those subjects given the "Durham instruction," Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d
862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). A third group of subjects who were given no instructions at
all responded almost identically to the group given the Durham instructions. Simon
therefore concludes that the Durham rule on insanity reflected her subjects' "natural
sense of equity" much more than did the M'Naghten rule. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND
THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 216 (1967).
50. The juror's sense of justice is "shared" with other members of society to the
extent that it is a product of fairly stable socialization experiences common to society
and reflccts basic societal values about what is just. See, e.g., Aronfreed, The So-
cialization of Altruistic and Sympathetic Behavior: Some Theoretical and Experimental
Analyses, in ALTmuisN AND HELPING BEHAVIOR 103 (J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz eds. 1970).
Ideally, therefore, 12 jurors will not have 12 different notions about what is an
equitable result. In a pluralistic society such as our own, however, individuals are
socialized into many different sub-groups, and thus a 12-person jury may bring several
different senses of equity into the courtroom. The extent of such differences, with
their implications for the selection of a jury which is representative of the make-up
of the community at large, remains a question for future research. See also note
105 infra.
51. Several jurisprudential writers support the existence of commonly held notions
of justice, an idea generally associated with the jurisprudence of natural law. See
H. SPENCER, JUsTICE: BEING PART IV OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS 29-34 (1891); N.
TiMASHEFF, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 71-72, 75 (1939); Note, supra
note 11, at 178. Timasheff reasons that a situation is just to the extent that it is a
concrete embodiment of a recognized system of values. Where the relevant system
of values is not determined by society but is individual instead, no outside observer
is able to judge how just a situation may be. Socially recognized systems of values
exist, however, and to the extent that such value systems are shared by members of
society, outside observers of an event may validly decide to what extent the event con-
forms to the social system of values. Generally, agencies such as courts evaluate given
situations, but a member of society who shares in its system of values, for instance a
juror, may also make this evaluation. Timasheff maintains, then, that a socialized
member of a group will have a sense of what his group defines as equitable. N.
TIMASHEFF, supra at 75.
Spencer explains that an "altruistic sentiment of justice" develops in the individual
in the course of his adaptation to social life. Because of his intelligence and his de-
pendence on a group, man develops a capacity to sympathize with other men. A
feeling displayed by one man is apt to arouse kindred feelings in others. As a result
of this ability to imagine himself in the place of another, altruistic sentiments of
justice are formed and shared with other members of society. H. SPENCER, supra.
52. See § L.A supra.
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the individual case are reflected in the role of the jury. The jury is
legally expected to follow the judge's instructions in rendering its ver-
dict, but practically it has the power to deviate from the general law.
The crucial element in the disagreement between those legal commen-
tators who support and those who criticize the jury's sovereignty is the
degree to which juries are thought to rely on commonly held notions
of justice or equity in refusing to apply the general law. Although it
is an important element in the controversy over the proper function of
the jury in our system of justice, the jury's sense of equity remains rela-
tively poorly understood.53
II. Social Psychology and Shared Notions of Equity
In recent years social psychologists have begun to construct experi-
mental models of the judicial system to discover what extra-legal devices
individuals use in making judgments of blameworthiness.5 4 Such re-
search has been done to a large degree by investigators testing a major
theoretical orientation of social psychology termed "equity theory."
A. Postulates of Equity Theory
Equity theory is developed in the work of Homans5 and J. Stacy
Adams,56 and it has recently been reviewed by Walster.5 7 It presumes
man to be an economic, self-interested actor who, however, has been so-
cialized and is a member of a social group. Equity theory postulates
that, although individuals will try to maximize their individual out-
comes (i.e., increase their rewards and minimize their costs),58 unre-
strained efforts at self-aggrandizement would lead to social conflict
which would eventually lower everyone's outcomes. Since groups can
maximize collective outcomes by evolving accepted systems for appor-
tioning rewards and costs among members, they will evolve such sys-
53. For example, to what extent is it the juror's sense of equity rather than his
incompetence or prejudices which accounts for the jury's deviation from the law? What
effect do the judge's instructions have on the juror's exercise of his sense of equity?
What are the dimensions, the relevant considerations, of the juror's sense of equity and
to what extent do they differ from legally relevant criteria?
54. This focus is reflected by the latest American Psychological Association Con-
vention, Montreal, August 1973, which sponsored a symposium on "Social Psychology
and the Courtroom." In addition, the most recent American Sociological Association
Convention, New York, August 27-30, 1973, restricted the scope of the section on social
psychology to studies involving the jury.
55. G. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1961).
56. Adams. Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN ExPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 267 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1965).
57. Walster, Berscheid & Walster, New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PaRs.
& Soc. PsYCH. 151 (1973).
58. Id. The meaning of "rewards" and "costs" is discussed at pp. 1033-34 infra.
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tems and will attempt to induce members to accept and adhere to
them. 51 The accepted systems which evolve for apportioning rewards
and costs, then, become the criteria for "equitable" behavior. Thus, in
any society there will be a general consensus as to what constitutes an
"equitable relationship." 60
Although every society will institutionalize systems for equitably
apportioning rewards and costs, the perception of what constitutes an
equitable apportionment may vary from culture to culture. In spite
of this variance, equity theory posits a single general principle which
expresses the diverse conceptions about what is equitable. This prin-
ciple states that an equitable relationship exists when the person evalu-
ating the relationship (who could be either a participant in the rela-
tionship or an outside observer) perceives that each participant is re-
ceiving equal proportional outcomes from the relationship (i~e., the
ratios of the participants' outcomes to inputs are equal).61
Adams 2 expressed this principle in the form of an equation:
OutcomesA (rewards-costs) Outcomes, (rewards-costs)
InputsA (assets-liabilities) InputsB (assets-liabilities)
"Outcomes" are the positive ("rewards") and negative ("costs") con-
sequences that a participant in a relationship incurs from his relation-
ship with another. Generally "inputs" are the participant's contribu-
tions to the relationship which entitle him to rewards or costs. "Assets"
are positive inputs which entitle the participant to rewards; "liabilities"
are negative inputs which entitle him to costs. In social settings, for ex-
ample, assets may consist of work done, physical attractiveness, or social
status, while laziness, nonconformity, or failure may constitute liabili-
ties.6 3 For example, in the employer-employee relationship, higher
wages (increased outcome) should lead the employee to work harder
(increased input) to "justify" the pay raise (to keep his ratio of out-
59. Walster, Berscheid & Walster, supra note 57, at 151.
60. Id. at 153.
61. Id. at 152.
62. Adams, supra note 56.
63. The merit and strength of relevant "outcomes" and "inputs" in the equity
equation are nevertheless probably perceived rather differently by two participants in
a relationship, each distorting his perception to justify larger personal outcomes. Also,
the victim in an inequitable relationship is likely to feel more distress than the
harmdoer. Legant, Equity Theory and the Law: Suggestions for Future Research 12
(paper presented at the American Psychological Association Convention, August 1973).
An observer's perception of the relevant inputs and outcomes of participants in a
relationship is likely to undergo similar distortion to the extent that he identifies
with either of the participants. Id. This supports the view of trial tacticians that
attorneys should select jurors who are similar to his client and thus more likely to
identify with him. See H. BODIN, supra note 28.
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comes to inputs equal to that of his employer). By the same process,
an increase in profits (increased outcome) for the employer, who has
not increased his own capital or work input, will increase the em-
ployer's ratio of outcomes to inputs and should motivate the employee
either to seek higher wages or to reduce his own work input.0 4
Although society attempts to reward equitable behavior and to in-
crease the costs for inequitable behavior, an individual will still be-
have inequitably as long as he perceives that he can maximize his
total outcomes by so doing. Because individuals are socialized and
conditioned to behave equitably, however, equity theory maintains
that when individuals find themselves participating in inequitable
relationships, they become "distressed"; the more inequitable the
relationship, the more distress individuals feel.65 The distress of those
who are receiving less than they perceive to be equitable may take the
form of anger, 0 while those who are receiving more than they per-
ceive they deserve also experience distress, generally in the form of
guilt.0 7
The final postulate of equity theory is that individuals who discover
that they are in an inequitable relationship will attempt to eliminate
their distress by restoring equity. 8 The greater the inequity that ex-
ists, the more distress individuals feel, and the more motivated they
are to restore equity. Equity may be restored in either of two ways.
First, the individual may restore "actual equity" by appropriately
altering his own outcomes or inputs or the outcomes or inputs of the
other participant in the inequitable relationship. 6 Secondly, the indi-
64. See, e.g., Adams & Rosenbaum, The Relationship of Worker Productivity to
Cognitive Dissonance about Wage Inequities, 46 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 161 (1962).
65. Walster, Berscheid & Walster, supra note 57, at 153.
66. See E. JACQuES, EQUITABLE PAYMENT (1961); Leventhal, Allen & Kemelgor,
Reducing Inequity by Reallocating Rewards, 14 PSYCHONOMIC SCIENCE 295 (1969); Thi-
baut, An Experimental Study of the Cohesiveness of Underprivileged Groups, 3 HUMAN
REL. 251 (1950); Walster, Berscheid & Walster, Reactions of an Exploiter to the
Exploited: Compensation, Justification or Self-Punishment?, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING
BEHAVIOR, supra note 50, at 179.
67. See E. JACQUES, supra note 66: Adams & Rosenbaum, supra note 64: Adams,
Toward an Understanding of Inequity, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 422 (1963);
Leventhal, Allen & Kemelgor, supra note 66.
68. Walster, Berscheid & Walster, supra note 57, at 153-54.
69. For example, Leventhal, Allen & Kemelgor had experimental subjects work on
arithmetical tasks together with a confederate of the experimenters. After the set of tasks
was completed, the subject and confederate were given S1.40 to be divided between
them. The confederate made the initial division, systematically allocating more than
half the reward to some subjects and less than half to others, even though both the
subject and confederate had worked equally hard to earn the reward. After this initial
division the subjects were permitted to alter slightly the initial allocation of the
reward. The results showed that those subjects initially given more than half the
reward decreased their share, while the subjects initially given less than half in-
creased their share of the reward when given the chance to do so. Leventhal. Allen
& Kemelgor, supra note 66. See also Leventhal & Anderson, Self-Interest and the
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vidual may restore "psychological equity" to what he perceives to be
an inequitable relationship by changing his perception of his own or
the other's outcomes and inputs.70 One major question still unan-
swered by equity theorists and researchers is under what conditions
individuals will choose to restore actual equity rather than merely
psychological equity-two radically different approaches to resolving
the imbalance.7 1
B. Observers' Motivation to Restore Equity
A positive finding by equity researchers, however, is that both par-
ticipants and observers of a relationship are equipped to assess its
equitable balance through socialized norms of equity. Equally im-
portant, there is evidence that observers of an inequitable relation-
ship also experience distress in much the same way as do participants
in the relationship and are thereby similarly motivated to restore
actual or psychological equity to the perceived inequitable relation-
ship.7
2
Maintenance of Equity, 15 J. PLRS. & Soc. PsYcH. 57 (1970); Leventhal & Lane, Sex,
Age and Equity Behavior, 15 J. PERS. & SoC. PSYCH. 312 (1970); Leventhal & Michaels,
Extending the Equity Model: Perception of Inputs and Allocation of Reward as a
Function of Duration and Quantity of Performance, 12 J. PERS. & SoC. PSYCH. 303 (1969).
There is evidence that a principle of utility may alter strict compliance with the
equity equation: Rewards may tend to be given to those who can make the best use
of them. Leventhal and his associates have found experimental evidence of the "con-
servation of reward value." Leventhal, Weiss & Buttrock, Attribution of Value, Equity,
and the Prevention of Waste in Reward Allocation, 27 J. PERs. & Soc. PSYCH. 276 (1973).
They found that subjects gave relatively more reward to recipients most likely to
make use of it, especially where the reward would deteriorate if not used promptly and
where recipients had made good use of similar rewards on past occasions. This equity
principle of conservation of reward is reflected in the legal principle that damages
for breach of contract should be the cost of performance of the contract only where
this "does not involve unreasonable economic waste." Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal &
Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 112 (Okla. 1962).
70. For example, in the experiment by Leventhal, Allen & Kemelgor, supra note
66, discussed at note 69 supra, subjects were allowed to redistribute only $.05 of the
total reward, and therefore actual equity was probably not fully restored for most
subjects. Through a questionnaire administered at the end of the experiment, the
experimenters were able to measure certain perceptual distortions by the subjects.
The responses of the subjects indicated that the greater the negative inequity im-
posed by the confederate in his initial division of the reward, the greater was the
confederate's perceived control over the division of the reward and the greater was
the subject's intention of taking a larger share of the reward in future tasks. See
also Lerner, Observer's Evaluation of a Victim: Justice, Guilt, and Veridical Percep-
tion, 20 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 127 (1971); Lerner & Lichtman, Effects of Perceived
Norms on Attitudes and Altruistic Behavior Toward a Dependent Other, 9 J. PERS.
& SoC. PsYcH. 226 (1968); Lerner & Matthews, Reactions to Suffering of Others under
Conditions of Indirect Responsibility, 5 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 319 (1967); Lerner &
Simmons, Observer's Reaction to the "Innocent Victim": Compassion or Rejection?, 4
J. PERs. & Soc. PsvcH. 203 (1966); Simmons & Lerner, Altruism as a Search for Justice,
9 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 216 (1968).
71. See Macaulay & Walster, supra note 7. A harmdoer is probably more disposed
to restore psychological equity than is his victim, who would want actual equity
restoration in the form of compensation.
72. See Legant, supra note 60, at 3.
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Equity-restoring behavior on the part of observers of inequitable
relationships has been studied experimentally by Lerner and his asso-
ciates.73 Lerner contends that all people have a need to believe in a
world ordered by justice,74 i.e., that the world is not governed by a
series of random reinforcements but rather that "there is an appropri-
ate fit between what they do and what happens to them-their out-
comes." 75 This need to believe in a just world is threatened for an
observer of inequity. The observer, therefore, will be motivated to
restore either actual or psychological equity to the perceived inequit-
able relationship in order to maintain his belief in a just world. Where
the observer has no power to change the perceived inequity, he may
restore psychological equity by "blaming the victim"76 for the inequity,
but when given a chance to restore actual equity to the relationship,
the observer will attempt to do so.77
This finding-that observers of inequitable relationships are them-
selves motivated to restore equity to the observed relationship-could
have extremely important implications for the legal debate over the
degree to which juries are guided by learned notions of justice rather
than accidental feelings when they deviate from the general law. The
juror, of course, is an excellent example of an observer of alleged in-
equitable relationships who has the capacity to restore actual as well
as psychological equity. It appears that the juror, therefore, has a real,
personal need to restore equity to inequitable relationships between
plaintiffs and defendants, relying on his sense of what constitutes an
equitable relationship which he shares with other members of society.
The "equity equation,"78 therefore, might be able to serve as a model
of the little understood notion of the juror's sense of equity. As con-
73. See articles cited in note 70 supra.
74. Lerner & Simmons, supra note 70, at 203.
75. Id.
76. See generally W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VIcTIm (1971).
77. The tendency of observers to restore actual rather than merely psychological
equity when given the opportunity to do so was demonstrated experimentally by
Lerner and Simmons. The subjects believed that they were watching the "victim" in
a learning exercise who was given an electric shock whenever she made a mistake.
After 10 minutes of such observation, half the subjects were told that they could
vote for the victim to undergo a positive reinforcement schedule next or to continue
in the negative "shock" condition. Then all the subjects were asked to evaluate the
victim. Subjects who were not given the opportunity to change the victim's fate
derogated her and found her relatively unattractive (restoring equity psychologically).
The other subjects all voted (except for one) to assign her to the positive reward
condition, thus ameliorating her fate and restoring actual equity. Lerner & Simmons,
supra note 70. An observer may, in fact, be more motivated to restore actual equity
than the harmdoing participant, since the observer need not distort his perception of
the relationship (thereby restoring psychological equity) in order to avoid distress
and actual equity restoration.
78. See note 61 supra.
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tinued research sketches in the dimensions of the rewards, costs, assets,
and liabilities which constitute an equitable relationship in our soci-
ety, our questions about jury equity may come to be answered.7 9
One difficulty with equity theory is that it provides little theoretical
guidance for discovering what constitute the relevant outcomes and
inputs of an equitable relationship. Determining the relative weights
which individuals attach to various outcomes may not be terribly dif-
ficult, but discovering what the inputs (both assets and liabilities) are
which entitle participants in a relationship to rewards and costs and,
furthermore, how the existence of these inputs are inferred by the
observer (juror) of a relationship, is much more complex. This task
is essential, however, in discovering the "principles" of jury equity.
C. Attribution Theory: Refining the Equity Equation
Social psychologists who have made contributions toward determin-
ing the relevant assets and liabilities of the equity equation have gen-
erally been concerned with the process by which observers come to
attribute responsibility or blameworthiness to an actor for a given
event. Heider ° and Thibaut and Reicken 8l contend that people have
a need for perceptual order and that the attribution of internal dispo-
sitions (which may also be inputs in the equity equation) to others is
an important source of this order, allowing people to maintain stable
cognitions about the meaning of various behaviors. For example,
assume that an observer witnesses a man strike a small child. Without
more information, the observer will tend to justify82 the action by
inferring that the child deserved the blow or that the man, perhaps the
79. For example, experimental research by Jones & Nisbett, The Actor and the
Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior, in ATrRIUTION: PERCEIVINC
THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 79 (1972); Nisbett, Caputo, Legant & Marecek, Behavior as
Seen by the Actor and as Seen by the Observer, 27 J. PERs. & Soc. PSYCH. 154 (1973);
Storms, Videotape and the Attribution Process: Reversing Actors' and Observers' Point
of View, 27 J. PERS. & Soc. PsYcH. 165 (1973), indicates that an actor feels that his
behavior is caused by external factors in his environment, whereas an observer of the
actor's behavior feels that the behavior is caused by characteristics of the actor. Legant,
supra note 60. at 12, reasons that due to this fundamental difference in perception,
"a defendant may tend to offer situational explanations for his behavior, such as
financial need, social pressure, or road conditions, while a victim, plaintiff, witness,
judge, juror, or member of the public will tend to stress reasons involving moral
character and intent. In fact, the law, as observer, refuses to consider extenuating
situational circumstances such as prior misfortunes in adjudicating guilt." Thus, in
those situations in which a juror is likely to identify with a defendant, the juror
also will tend to attribute the defendant's behavior to environmental factors and
therefore in these situations the juror's sense of equity might diverge from the
applicable law.
80. Heider, Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality, 51 PSYCH. REV. 358 (1944).
81. Thibaut & Reicken, Some Determinants and Consequences of the Perception
of Social Causality, 24 J. PERs. 113 (1955).
82. See the discussion on need to believe in a just world at pp. 1035-36 supra.
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child's father, is punishing it with no intention of doing the child any
harm. Told, however, that the man is generally cruel, the observer will
tend to infer that the child is generally well-behaved, the man intended
to strike the child, the act is inequitable, and the man should be held
responsible for his inequitable action.
Heider divides perception of causality into "personal causation,"
which includes events which another produced and intended to pro-
duce, and "impersonal causation," which encompasses externally
caused events and those caused by an actor who did not intend to cause
them.83 Heider then contends that people hold others responsible only
for events which result from personal causation. Relying on Piaget's
work on the development of perceptions of causality in children, 4
Heider proposes that all people go through five stages in the develop-
ment of their perception of responsibility for an event.85 At the first
stage, we perceive another person as responsible for events in any way
connected with him. At the second stage, responsibility for an event
is attributed only if the other has actually caused the event. At the
third stage, forseeability of the consequences of the other's act as well as
causality is required before responsibility will be attributed to the
other. At the fourth stage, the other is held responsible only for events
and consequences which he intended to produce.86 Finally, Heider
describes a fifth stage of the development of notions of responsibility
in which the other is not held entirely responsible even for acts and
consequences which he intended to produce. In this stage, various justi-
fications and excuses87 lead the observer to sympathize with the other
83. F. HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 100-09 (1958).
84. J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1932).
85. F. HEIDER, supra note 83, at 112-14.
86. Studies by Garrett 8c Libby, Role of Intentionality in Mediating Responses to
Inequity in the Dyad, 28 J. PERS. & Soc. PsYCH. 21 (1973); Greenberg & Frisch, Effects
of Intentionality on Willingness to Reciprocate a Favor, 8 J. ExP. Soc. PSYCH. 99 (1972);
and Rule & Duker, Effects of Intentions and Consequences on Children's Evaluations
of Aggressors, 27 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 184 (1973), provide experimental evidence of
the powerful effect of intent as a negative input. See also Maselli & Altrocchi, Attribution
of Intent, 71 PSYCH. BULL. 445 (1969); and Walster, Berscheid & Walster, supra note
57, at 167-68, for a review of studies which focus upon the importance of intent in
attribution of responsibility. As Walster concludes: "When the inequity is inten-
tionally produced, participants in an inequitable relationship will experience more
distress and will have stronger desires to restore equity to the relationship than if
the inequity occurs inadvertently." Id. at 167.
87. The relationship of excuses and justifications is illustrated in the related
theoretical works of Scott & Lyman, Accounts, 33 AM. Soc. REV. 46 (1968), who discuss
the nature of "accounting" to others for one's apparent improprieties, and Sykes &
Matza, Techniques of Neutralization, 22 Aar. Soc. REV. 664 (1957), who discuss tech-
niques for rationalizing one's improper actions to oneself. According to their analyses,
an "excuse" is a direct denial of having caused, having forseen the consequences of,
or having intended to commit the act of which one is accused. Such an excuse attempts
to deny responsibility for an event by negating the crucial elements of Heider's Stages
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and refrain from holding him responsible for the intended event.8 s
The variables in Heider's fifth stage which diminish the attribution
of responsibility for an intentional act can be viewed as positive inputs
in the equity equation's model of jury equity, entitling a participant
in a relationship to more rewards and fewer costs. Clarification of these
variables through further research should therefore illuminate the
dimensions of the juror's sense of equity. Comparisons could then be
made between the juror's sense of equity and various legal criteria of
responsibility and exculpation, such as mens rea,s9 provocation,90 self-
defense,"' duress, 2 necessity,9 3 intoxication, 94 diminished capacity,95
Two, Three, or Four, respectively. An alternative to the excuse is the "justification,"
whereby one concedes responsibility for the consequences of an event but denies that
the event was in fact inequitable. Contentions that "nobody got hurt," "he de-
served it," or "everybody does it" are common justifications.
88. Experimental support for Heider's conception of developmental stages in the
attribution of responsibility is provided in studies by Shaw & Sulzer, An Empirical
Test of Heider's Levels in Attribution of Responsibility, 69 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCn.
39 (1964); Shaw, Some Cultural Differences in Sanctioning Behavior, 8 PSYCHONOMIC
SCIENCE 45 (1967); and Sulzer & Burglass, Responsibility Attribution, Empathy, and
Punitiveness, 36 J. PERs. 272 (1968). In these studies subjects were presented with 20
stories, four of the stories presenting the minimum factors required for attribution
of responsibility at each of Heider's five stages. Subjects were asked how responsible
the central actor in each story was for the negative or positive consequences of an
event. In general, subjects attributed more responsibility to the central actor as the
stories moved from Stage One (association) to Stage Four (intentional causation) and
somewhat less responsibility in Stage Five (extenuating circumstances). There was an
extremely high rate of disagreement among subjects, however, in attributing respon-
sibility at Stage Five. By further investigating the variables which affect responsibility
attribution in light of various extenuating circumstances, researchers can clarify those
mitigating factors which are relevant inputs in the observer's sense of equity.
89. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Comment at
123-32 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Regina v. Cunningham, 41 Crim. App. R. 155, 3
Weekly L.R. 76 (1957); People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr.
271 (1964).
90. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Comment
at 40-48 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 221-22, 81 Am.
Dec. 781, 786 (18621; Haley v. State, 123 Miss. 87. 85 So. 129 (1920); State v. Bongard,
330 Mo. 805, 51 S.W.2d 84 (1932); Elsmore v. State, 132 Tex. Ct. App. 261, 104 S.W.2d
493 (1937).
91. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Comment
at 14-30 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958); Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 11 So. 250 (1892);
State v. Mayberry, 360 Mo. 35, 226 S.W.2d 725 (1950); State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63,
174 A.2d 881 (1961).
92. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Comment at
2-16 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 358 (9th
Cir. 1951); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 908 (1955).
93. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Comment at
5-10 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958); United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1842); Comment, The Law of Necessity as Applied in the Bisbee Deportation Case, 3
ARIz. L. REv. 264 (1961); Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1964).
94. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Comment at
2-13 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 815 (1966); Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401 (1870). But see State v. Shipman, 354
Mo. 265, 189 S.W.2d 273 (1945).
95. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Comment at
193 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); People v. Conley. 64 Cal. 2d 310, 316, 411 P.2d 911,
914, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 818 (1966); People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959,
10 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964); People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
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insanity, 90 and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the
Model Penal Code97 and proposed Federal Criminal Code98 concern-
ing capital punishment.
The law in fact seems to reflect closely Heider's levels of responsi-
bility in the amount of blameworthiness it allocates to specific acts. No
legal responsibility is attached at Stage One, mere association. There
are but a few instances of "strict liability" which require only causa-
tion (Stage Two) by the harmdoer for the legal system to intervene.
Tort liability, however, generally requires that the resulting harm have
been reasonably foreseeable (Stage Three) by the harmdoer. Finally,
criminal laws generally require that the harmdoer have intended (Stage
Four) to commit the criminal act. In addition, some justifications
(Stage Five) such as self-defense, provocation, or duress are legally rec-
ognized as defenses to a criminal prosecution.9" Therefore, one would
expect the jury's criteria for determining responsibility for a given
inequitable act not to vary significantly from the legal criteria.
10 0
Specific internal states, such as intentionality, are certainly important
determinants of the amount of responsibility an observer will attribute
to an actor. Such internal states, whether they are legally part of the
mens rea of an offense or simply constitute part of the observer's sense
of equity, must usually be imputed to the actor, since they are not ex-
ternally observable.' 0 ' The process by which internal states are so in-
ferred thus becomes important in gaining a deeper understanding of
the jury's sense of equity. Jones and Davis suggest a model of the proc-
ess by which people infer an actor's specific internal state from ob-
servable events.' 0 2 They contend, like Heider, that the observer needs
to and does account for the causes of behavior, and that one way he
does so is in terms of the effects of that behavior. Also, behavior is
accounted for to the extent that an observer can associate it with a
general internal disposition of the actor. For example, an observer can
account for the man striking a child (the observable event) by inferring
96. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Comment at
156-60 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. 9- F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718
(H.L. 1843); United States v. Brauner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
97. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Comment at
63-80 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
98. PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, Provisional § 3604 (Final Report, National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, 1971).
99. See pp. 103940 supra.
100. H. KALVEN & H. ZkISEL, supra note 13, at 193-347, in fact indicate that this
is probably the case.
101. The possible difficulty in making this imputation is illustrated by the case
of People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 889-900, 156 P.2d 7, 12-13 (1945).
102. Jones & Davis, Attribution Process in Person Perception, in 2 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1965).
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that the man is angry (specific internal state) at the child,. The man's
anger may be inferred from the child's suffering immediately follow-
ing the blow (an effect of the act) or from the observer's knowledge
that the man is generally hostile (general internal disposition). Further-
more, where the man's anger is perceived as being caused by the child's
behavior (an external source), the man will be held less responsible
for any harmful effect to the child than if his anger were perceived
to stem from his general hostility.
An observer may infer the actor's internal state (e.g., anger) at the
time of the act "down" from what the observer perceives to be the ac-
tor's general internal disposition (e.g., hostility), or the observer may
infer the crucial internal state of the actor at the time of the act "up"
from the effect of the act (e.g., the child's crying), seeking correspond-
ence 0 3 between the consequences of the act and the actor's internal
state. For example, if our unfortunate child is frail and dies from the
man's blow, the man's internal state will be perceived by an observer
as more culpable-due to more anger or greater intention to cause
serious harm-than if the child suffered only a bruise, no matter what
the man's internal state actually was, and more responsibility for the
act will be attributed to him.
The process of attributing internal states to an actor is an important
determinant of the observer's perception of the actor's responsibility
for an event. Such internal states become relevant inputs in the juror's
sense of equity.
III. Applications of Equity and Attribution Theory
A. Suggested Principles of Jury Equity
The real importance of the theory and research findings of social
psychologists interested in equitable behavior and attribution of re-
sponsibility lies in the framework they provide for systematically pur-
103. Jones & Davis, supra note 102, use the term "correspondence" to describe the
association which people tend to perceive between an actor's internal state and the ef-
fect of the act or between the actor's internal state and the actor's general disposition.
The correspondence observers seek between an actor's internal state and the effects
of an act is illustrated by an experiment by Walster, who found that the more severe
were the negative consequences of an act, the more an observer held the actor re-
sponsible for the act. Subjects listened to tape recordings of four versions of an
account of a man whose car accidentally rolled down a hill. The accounts were
identical except for the consequences of the accident, which ranged from little to
severe damage and injury to others. The results show that subjects imputed a more
culpable internal state to the man as the severity of the consequences of the accident
increased. Walster, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J. PERs. & Soc.
PSYCH. 73 (1966).
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suing answers to questions about the jury's sense of equity. Without
the direction provided by such a theoretical framework, lawyers would
be left to guess the "principles" of jury equity from empirical generali-
zations such as those reported by Kalven and Zeisel' 04 or, worse, from
the educated guesses and folk wisdom of experienced trial lawyers. As
research on equitable behavior and the attribution of responsibility
continues, further dimensions of the juror's sense of equity will be
uncovered.'0 5 Although the purpose of this Note is chiefly to point out
the direction that social psychology can provide to legal researchers in-
terested in jury sovereignty and jury equity, selected preliminary prin-
ciples of jury equity based on existing social psychological research
findings can be formulated for purposes of illustration. 10
104. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 13.
105. To the extent that perceptions of fairness or equity differ among individuals
in a given community, social psychologists are interested in learning how to predict
such differences. Experimental research indicates that certain personality characteristics
can explain much of the variation in individual perceptions of equity. See Legant,
supra note 60; cf. note 50 supra.
For example, high authoritarians have been found to attribute responsibility to an
accused against whom there is little or ambiguous evidence more often than do low
authoritarians. P. Legant, The Deserving Victim: Effects of Length of Pretrial De-
tention, Crime Severity, and Juror Attitudes on Simulated Jury Decisions (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Yale University 1973); Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy,
and the Authoritarian Personality: An Application of Psychological Measuring Tech-
niques to the Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 734 (1968); Crosson, An In-
vestigation into Certain Personality Variables Among Capital Trial Jurors, 3 PRO-
CEEDINGs, 76TH ANNUAL CONVENTION, AM. PSYCH. ASS'N 371 (1968); Jurow, New Data
on the Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84
HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971); Mitchell & Byrne, Minimizing the Influence of Irrelevant
Factors in the Courtroom: The Defendant's Character, Judge's Instructions, and Au-
thoritarianism (unpublished manuscript, Purdue University 1972); Sulzer & Burglass,
supra note 88. Legant, for example, found that even though all her experimental
jurors had viewed the same video-taped simulated trial, those jurors who scored high
on a measure of authoritarianism liked the defendant significantly less and sug-
gested a significantly longer sentence for him than did jurors who had low scores
on the authoritarianism measure. P. Legant, supra. In addition, Sulzer and Burglass
found that as the ambiguity of an actor's responsibility for harm done increased
(while the severity of harm done remained constant), the discrepancy in responsibility
for the harm attributed to him by high and low authoritarian subjects also increased,
the high authoritarians attributing relatively more responsibility to the actor than
the low authoritarians. Sulzer & Burglass, supra note 88.
By way of comparison, Goldstein, the noted trial tactician, recommends that plain.
tiff's counsel should seek jurors of Irish, Jewish, Italian, French, and Slavic national
origin because these nationalities are less strict than the Nordic type of juror (German,
English, and Scandinavian) and will more readily sympathize with the plaintiff. I.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 29, at 156-57. See also H. ROTHBLATr, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES
IN THE TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES (1961). If the so-called Nordic juror, however, tends
to be more authoritarian than other jurors, as commonly thought, the research just
described indicates that Nordic jurors would in fact be more plaintiff-oriented than
other jurors in a close case where defendant's responsibility for the resulting harm
is ambiguous.
106. Empirical testing of these or other suggested principles of jury equity of
course requires that techniques be developed for operationalizing the principles and
concepts contained therein in experimental judicial settings. See note 148 infra.
It should be made clear that these preliminary principles of jury equity are not
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Principle One. The more the defendant incurs "costs" in the commis-
sion of an offense, the less punishment he will be given.
If the defendant has been injured or suffers other costs in connec-
tion with his "inequitable relationship" with his victim, he reduces
his outcomes from the relationship and thus less punishment should be
required to restore equity to the relationship. 07 Kalven and Zeisel'10
report that several juries they studied gave light sentences to defendants
who received considerable "punishment" from the commission of the
crime itself.'09
Similar considerations of inadvertently reduced inequity are re-
ported in experiments by Bramel 10 and Berscheid, 11 who found 'that
fortuitous punishment of an offender reduced the victim's need to
personally restore equity. Walster"1 2 cautions, however, that fortuitous
punishment will reduce inequity only where there is a causal relation-
ship between the offense and the defendant's suffering'" (as would
most certainly be the case where defendant is injured in the commis-
sion of the offense). Legant's" 4 experimental finding that sentences
handed down by simulated jurors did not reflect the length of time
defendant had spent in pretrial detention indicates that even such pre-
presented as normative propositions for legal reform. They are merely descriptive of
dimensions of jury equity which seem to be indicated by social psychological research.
Whether they should be incorporated into the legal system or whether juries should
be instructed against following them is a separate question not addressed here.
107. Since equity may also be restored by changing one's perceptions of the rele-
vant inputs of the participants, however, this hypothesis is open to the criticism that
the defendant's suffering could make the defendant less attractive and thus become
a negative input rather than a negative outcome in the equity equation. This would
actually increase the inequity between the defendant and his victim. See Lerner,
supra note 70. Further research is needed to determine when the defendant's suffering
will elicit actual as opposed to psychological compensation.
108. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 13, at 301-05.
109. Judges have also reasoned this way. In a case in New Haven Superior Court,
judge O'Sullivan, in lieu of a jail term or even probation, was content to levy a $100
fine on a defendant with a lengthy criminal record who was found guilty of assault
for threatening his former wife with a knife. Commenting on the fact that the de-
fendant had been shot by his former wife during the commission of the offense,
losing a kidney as a result, Judge O'Sullivan said, "He's been punished more than
anything I could do." New Haven Register, April 7, 1973, at 42, col. 7; see also id.,
March 17, 1973, at 42, col. 1.
110. Bramel, Taub & Blum, An Observer's Reaction to the Suffering of His
Enemy, 8 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 384 (1968).
111. Berscheid, Boye & Walster, Retaliation as a Means of Restoring Equity, 10
J. PEPs. & Soc. PsYcH. 370 (1968).
112. E. Walster, Equity Theory (unpublished manuscript 1973).
113. Compare this required nexus to the principle of legal equity that "he who
seeks equity must do equity," H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 1, at 55, and the limita-
tion on this principle that "a party can be required to do equity only with respect
to the transaction as to which he seeks equitable relief." Id. at 57.
114. P. Legant, supra note 105.
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trial detention may be outside of the required causal relationship
between the offense and the inadvertent punishment.11
Principle Two. Diminished capacity of the defendant at the time of the
offense will be a successful defense the more the defendant's behavior
was "out of character" for him while his capacity was diminished.
The Model Penal Code1" proposes that one mitigating circumstance
in a murder conviction is that: "At the time of the murder, the capac-
ity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication." While
at least one judge feels that the defense of intoxication does not gen-
erally appeal to the jury," 7 Kalven and Zeisel conclude from their
study that the jury may attribute responsibility for the crime to alcohol
rather than to the defendant if the defendant's actions were "utterly
out of character for him,"'" s thus exculpating the harmdoer in an
inequitable relationship.
Social psychologists provide theoretical and experimental support
for Kalven and Zeisel's conclusion about this aspect of jury equity.
Jones and Nisbett" 9 and Nisbett and associates120 have demonstrated
that actors tend to attribute their behavior to environmental causes
(such as intoxication), while observers usually attribute the causes of
behavior to an actor's personal traits. Reisman and Schopler,12 ' how-
ever, have demonstrated that when behavior is not characteristic of
an actor's past behavior or general dispositional traits, responsibility
for the behavior is attributed to environmental causes rather than to
the actor. For instance, suppose a normally mild-mannered person
becomes angry and strikes the person who has roused his anger. Reis-
man and Schopler's research indicates that observers of such behavior
will attribute the actor's behavior to "anger" and assign relatively
little responsibility to the generally mild-mannered actor; the emo-
115. For isolated examples of defendants who did receive lighter sentences after
long periods of pretrial detention, however, see H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note
13, at 303-05.
116. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Com-
ment at 68-74 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). See also notes 94-95 supra.
117. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 13, at 335.
118. Cf. Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 11 So. 250 (1892) (requested instruction
concerning the exculpatory effect of the combination of defendant's good character and
his intoxication at the time of the offense disallowed).
119. Jones & Nisbett, supra note 79.
120. Nisbett, Caputo, Legant & Marecek, supra note 79.
121. Reisman & Schopler, An Analysis of the Attribution Process and an Appli-
cation to Determinants of Responsibility, 25 J. PE~s. & Soc. Psycis. 361 (1973).
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tional state of "anger" is not closely associated with the actor in this
instance and thus becomes a separate, external cause of the actor's
behavior. This example is similar to a defendant who commits a crime
under diminished capacity. If the crime is not characteristic of the de-
fendant, an observer will tend to attribute the cause of the crime to the
source of the diminished capacity rather than to the defendant.
Principle Three. The greater the ambiguity surrounding the defend-
ant's civil liability or criminal guilt, the milder the damages or pun-
ishment will be.
This principle illustrates one way in which notions of equity may
take into account variables affecting attribution of responsibility for
the inequitable event. Given two similar events where the plaintiff
or victim suffers equally severe harm at the hands of similar defend-
ants found liable for the harm done or guilty of the crime, the equity
equation as well as the legal system would seem to demand equal dam-
ages or punishment to restore equity. Research on the attribution of
responsibility, however, indicates that where it has such discretion 122
the jury will return a harsher verdict against that defendant against
whom there is more evidence of liability or guilt, in effect discounting
the inequity by the degree of uncertainty of the evidence concerning
the defendant's responsibility for the inequitable event.123
The Model Penal Code and Proposed Federal Criminal Code reflect
this principle of jury equity. In sentencing a defendant who has been
found guilty of murder, both Codes would preclude the death penalty
from being imposed in cases where the court determines that "al-
though the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not foreclose
all doubt respecting the defendant's guilt."' 24 In addition, Kalven
122. In addition to recommending sentence and assessing damages, a jury may have
the right to determine the grade of the offense of which the defendant is to be con-
victed. See Allison v. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S.W. 409 (1905); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(10) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and Comment at 131-32 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955).
123. The threshold problem of the minimum level of evidence necessary to find
the defendant liable or guilty in the first place is of course different in civil than
in criminal cases. A civil case in favor of the plaintiff decided under the "pre-
ponderance of evidence" standard of certainty can legitimately leave some degree of
doubt in the mind of the juror as to the defendant's actual culpability. In contrast,
the uncertainty which a juror in a criminal case can feel about the defendant's
actual guilt and yet still convict under the stricter "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard is problematic. Although reasonable doubt surely does not mean not any
doubt, cf. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 97, and note 127 infra, the impact of
Principle Three may be more pronounced in civil rather than in criminal cases be-
cause of the extremely high level of certainty ideally required for a criminal conviction.
124. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6(l)(g) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); PROPOSED FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CODE, Provisional § 3603(c) (Final Report, National Commission on Reform
of Federal Criminal Laws, 1971).
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found in a study using experimental civil juries that where the amount
of harm done by the defendant was held constant, the experimental
juries awarded less in damages as the liability of the defendant became
less clear. 12 5
Social psychologists have also found experimental support for this
principle. Phares and Wilson, for example, offer evidence that where
the severity of the consequences is held constant, simulated jurors
exact less compensation from defendants the more the defendants are
not "wholly guilty."'126 Eighty subjects were presented with summaries
of eight actual civil cases, won by the plaintiff, which varied in severity
of the harm done (from severe to mild) and certainty of defendant's
liability (from certain to ambiguous). The subjects were asked to assess
the cases themselves and make an award of damages. Within each cate-
gory of severity of harm done, significantly higher damages were
awarded in the cases where defendant's liability was certain rather than
ambiguous. This indicates that jury equity takes into account any
doubt the jurors have about the defendant's liability or guilt in its
assessment of damages or punishment.
27
Principle Four. The less attractive the defendant or the more attrac-
tive the victim, the more punishment the defendant will be given for
injuring the victim.
This principle is based on the notion that attractiveness-good char-
acter, high social status, good looks, pleasing personality-is an asset in
the equity equation, entitling a participant in a relationship to rela-
tively more rewards than an unattractive person. Thus, the less attrac-
tive the defendant or more attractive the defendant's victim, the more
inequitable is the defendant's relationship with his victim, demanding
more punishment or a higher damage award to restore equity.
There is widespread support for this principle. At least one trial
tactician urges defense counsel to emphasize the unpleasantness of the
victim in attempting to mitigate the defendant's offense. 28 Also, Kal-
ven and Zeisel'2 9 report that in cases they studied where the jury
125. Kalven, supra note 33.
126. Phares & Wilson, Responsibility Attribution: Role of Outcome Severity, Situa-
tional Ambiguity, and Internal-External Control, 40 J. PERS. 392 (1972).
127. Compare Judge Frankel's intimation that it might not be improper for the
sentencing judge to take into account the weight of the evidence regarding de-
fendant's guilt in passing sentence. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CINN.
L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1972).
128. Cohen, Trial Tactics in Criminal Cases, in LEGAL AND CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY
51, 67-68 (H. Toch. ed. 1961).
129. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 13, at 200-18.
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acquitted a defendant whom the judge would have convicted, a fre-
quent cause of the jury's leniency was an attractive characteristic of
the defendant.'30
In addition, the principle is consistently supported in research by
equity theorists. For example, Landy and Aronson' 31 conducted two
experiments in which subjects read a description of a negligent homi-
cide case and were instructed to sentence the defendant to a term of
years in prison as if they were a juror in the case. The accounts of the
case read by the subjects were identical, except that in the first experi-
ment the victim was described as an unattractive person to half the
subjects and as an attractive person to the other half. 13" The second
experiment was similar to the first, except that the attractiveness of the
defendant was also varied. The results were as expected: Subjects pre-
sented with an attractive victim sentenced the defendant more severely
than did subjects presented with an unattractive victim, while the at-
tractive defendant was sentenced less severely than the unattractive de-
fendant. These results suggest that a defendant planning to use the "sad
tale account" described by Scott and Lyman to evoke the jury's sym-
pathy runs the risk of making himself unattractive to the jury in the
process.
1 3 3
Principle Five. The more the jury perceives that the defendant is being
singled out for prosecution from among others who are also guilty of
the same or a similar offense, the less punishment the defendant will be
given.
This occurs where the jury learns that an accomplice of the defend-
ant is not being prosecuted or is receiving preferential treatment, per-
130. Kalven and Zeisel also predict on the basis of their data that an unattractive
defendant would have a converse effect on the jury. Id. at 217.
131. Landy & Aronson, The Influence of the Character of the Criminal and His
Victim on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 5 J. ExP. Soc. PSYCH. 141 (1969). See also
Mitchell & Byrne, supra note 105; Jones & Aronson, Attribution of Fault to a Rape
Victim as a Function of Responsibility of the Victim, 26 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 415
(1973); Lerner, Evaluation of Performance as a Function of Performer's Reward and
Attractiveness, 1 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCH. 355 (1965); Mitchell & Byrne, The Defendant's
Dilemma: Effects of Jurors' Attitudes and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decisions, 25
J. PEaRS. & Soc. PSYcH. 123 (1973); Sigall & Landy, Effects of the Defendant's Character
and Suffering on Juridic Judgment: A Replication and Clarification, 88 J. Soc. PsYcH.
149 (1972).
132. The attractive victim was a stock broker, active in the community, and a
widower, who at the time of the mishap was on his way to an orphanage with
Christmas gifts. The unattractive victim was described as a notorious hoodlum and
ex-convict, a member of a crime syndicate which the police were investigating, who
was carrying a loaded 32-caliber pistol at the time of the mishap. The attractive and
unattractive defendants were similarly described. Landy & Aronson, supra note 131,
at 145, 148.
133. Scott &- Lyman, supra note 87, at 52.
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haps having "copped a plea." Kalven and Zeisel' 34 report cases where
juries acquitted a defendant, though the judge would have convicted
him, because the jury learned that the prosecution had charged an
accomplice with a lesser offense or had not prosecuted the accomplice
at all.'13-3 In a study of prison inmates, Casper'3" found that inmates
were not so much concerned about lengthy sentences or the basic equity
of their own sentences as they were with how the severity of their own
sentence compared with that of other offenders found guilty of a sim-
ilar crime.
This principle also applies where the defendant is being prosecuted
for breaking a law which is seldom enforced or is broken with im-
punity by others. Kalven and Zeisel x37 again report that their findings
indicate that the jury is often unwilling to convict for a violation of
"sumptuary legislation" concerning, for example, gambling and intoxi-
cation, because of the jury's perception that widespread violation of
these laws is tolerated."in In addition, Scott and Lyman insist that the
justification of "condemning the condemners"-arguing that others
frequently commit the impropriety which one is accused of without
being punished-is a common means of "accounting" for one's un-
toward behavior in everyday life.139
An explanation of this principle based on equity theory might be
that where the jury believes that the defendant is being singled out for
prosecution, the defendant's ratio of outcomes to inputs is less fre-
quently compared with his victim's ratio than it is with the outcomes
and inputs of accomplices in the same offense or of others who regu-
larly violate the law without cost. The jury works equity between sim-
ilar offenders as well as between offender and victim. This equity
principle of "even-handed justice" has not yet been explored in social
psychological investigations.
B. Effectiveness of Jury Instructions
No principle has been formulated concerning factors which influ-
ence the effectiveness of the judge's legal instructions in convincing
134. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 13, at 313-17.
135. Viewing the prosecution as plaintiff in a suit in equity, compare the principle
of legal equity that "he who seeks equity must do equity." H. MCCLINTOCK, supra
note 1, at 55.
136. J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECrIVE 89 (1971).
137. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISFL, supra note 13, at 287.
138. Viewing the prosecutor as representing a community which often breaks the
law for which the defendant is being prosecuted, compare the principle of legal
equity that one must "come into equity with clean hands." H. MCCLINTOCK, supra
note 1, at 59.
139. Scott & Lyman, supra note 87, at 51.
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the jury to rely on legally relevant criteria as opposed to its own sense
of equity in reaching its verdict. 140 Critics of jury sovereignty maintain
that the juror has a mind of his own and that legal instructions have
little if any predictable effect on quelling the so-called irrational fac-
tors which affect his decisionmaking. 141 Social psychological research,
however, has repeatedly shown that differential instructions to experi-
mental subjects can produce significantly different attitudes and be-
havior 142 and that subjects are usually quite willing to put their com-
plete trust in an experimenter's judgment about what constitutes
proper and improper behavior.
The extent to which subjects are willing to follow the instructions
of the experimenter was demonstrated dramatically in an experiment
by Milgram, 143 who succeeded in persuading his subjects to admin-
ister what the subjects thought were near fatal electric shocks to a fel-
low student simply by instructing them to do so. Under the guise of
conducting research on the effect of punishment on memory, Milgram
instructed individual subjects to administer increasingly severe shocks
to an accomplice of the experimenter each time the accomplice gave
a wrong answer to a series of questions. As the shocks increased to near
fatal dosages and the accomplice's cries of anguish increased, many
subjects attempted to break off the experiment. Milgram instructed
them to continue, however, and a remarkable 62 percent of all sub-
jects, complying with Milgram's instructions, did continue and admin-
istered what they thought to be the maximum, near fatal shock. Mil-
gram thus successfully instructed his subjects to suspend their own
personal senses of propriety for the duration of the experimental ses-
sion. A judge may be likened to an experimenter as a strong authority
figure who instructs jurors on the requirements of their roles as jurors.
If the experimenter can successfully instruct his subjects by means
available to the judge that the subject's own sense of fairness or equity
is not relevant to his role as subject, then the judge should likewise
140. Inasmuch as the judge's instructions constitute an attempt to persuade the
jury not to follow its own sense of equity but to follow instead the results indicated
by applicable law, the research on persuasive communications should help isolate
factors which will affect the judge's persuasiveness. See, e.g., C. HOVLAND, I. JANIS,
& H. KELLEY, COMMUNICATION & PERSUASION (1953). For a good review of such research
applied to the courtroom, see Commentary, supra note 27.
141. See pp. 1026-28 & note 26 supra.
142. See Aderman & Berkowitz, Observational Set, Empathy, and Helping, 14 J.
PERs. & Soc. PSYCH. 141 (1970); Stotland, Exploratory Investigations of Empathy, in 4
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 271 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1969).
143. Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18
HUMAN REL. 57 (1965). Milgram's experiments were conducted both at Yale University
and in Bridgeport, Connecticut.
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be able to persuade jurors that their own personal senses of equity are
not relevant to their roles as jurors.
44
Little research has been done on the amount of influence the judge
exerts through his instructions on the juror's performance of his role
as juror. Simon found that different judicial instructions to the jury
on the defense of insanity led to a significant difference in the fre-
quency of a finding of insanity by the jury,'4 5 and Mitchell and Byrne
report experimental evidence that low authoritarian simulated jurors
are much more responsive to judicial instructions than are high authori-
tarians.1
46
More research is obviously needed on the impact of judicial instruc-
tions on juror decisionmaking and on what factors influence that im-
pact, especially in light of the inconsistent findings of existing studies.1
47
C. Implications for Legal Issues
The above principles, and the more general hypotheses of social
psychology's equity and attribution theories from which they are de-
rived, suggest that members of a community internalize commonly
held notions of equitable relationships. Also, as jurors observing in-
equitable relationships, they are psychologically motivated to act
according to those shared notions in reaching a verdict and appor-
tioning rewards and punishments. The theory itself, and the refined
empirical data for which it calls,1 48 can have important implications
144. Admittedly, Milgram had the advantage of continuous eye contact and close
proximity to his subjects (compliance decreased as Milgram stood further from the
subjects), and he was able constantly to urge the subjects to proceed at every sign
of hesitation. These compliance strategies are generally not available to a judge. On
the other hand, the jury neither witnesses the victim's actual suffering nor must it
personally inflict compensation or punishment on the defendant, both factors which
encourage reliance on personal rather than on legal criteria of justice. In addition,
in experiments much less drastic than Milgram's, differential written instructions
significantly altered subjects' responses to the imagined suffering of another. See note
142 supra. This indicates that a judge need not go to the lengths Milgram did
before his instructions will have a significant impact on the jury.
145. R. SIMON, supra note 49.
146. Mitchell & Byrne, supra note 105.
147. Evidence that jurors do follow judicial instructions: R. SIMON, supra note
49; Mitchell & Byrne, supra note 105; Kalven, supra note 25, at 1064-65.
Evidence that judicial instructions can influence jurors: Aderman 8: Berkowitz, supra
note 142; Milgram, supra note 143; Stotland, supra note 142.
Evidence that jurors do not follow judicial instructions: Broeder, supra note 26;
Hervey, supra note 18; Hoffman & Brodley, supra note 18; Hunter, supra note 18.
148. Investigations on the impact of the jury's sense of equity on jury decision-
making are hampered by the fact that actual juries are inaccessible to researchers.
Alternatives to studying real-life juries as they reach their verdict, therefore, have
had to be developed. One such alternative is the survey method used by H. KALVEN
& H. ZEISEL, supra note 13. Data on over 3,500 actual cases accumulated through
questionnaires sent to presiding trial judges were used to make comparisons between
the jury's actual decision and how the judge indicated he would have decided the case.
In contrast, the experimental method allows much greater control than the survey
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for many issues in the debate concerning the role of jury sovereignty.
One important question, for example, is whether the judge should
instruct the jury about its power of nullification in a criminal case. In
United States v. Dougherty,140 the defendant's request for such an
instruction was denied, Judge Leventhal fearing unjust acquittals'50
and a loss of the tension in the juror's role between following general
law as opposed to the juror's own sense of justice. 15' Chief Judge
Bazelon, dissenting in part, 5 2 argued that the jury should be informed
of its function as the conscience of the community in the particular
case1'53 and felt that internal checks would restrain the jury's willing-
ness to acquit.'54 Social psychological research indicates that the in-
ternal checks referred to by Chief Judge Bazelon are very real and that,
even where he knows of his power of nullification, a juror has a strong
psychological need to see the case settled according to his sense of
equity.' 5 This need should act as a restraint on the juror's feelings
of sympathy for the defendant. In light of a judge's probable influence
method over the suspected determinants of jury decisionmaking which the investigator
wishes to explore. One drawback of the experimental method is that it requires the
investigator to rely on data from simulated trial settings and then apply the data
from such settings to an actual trial jury. Making valid generalizations from simulated
trial settings depends heavily on the investigator's ability to recreate the essential
dynamics of an actual trial and researchers have sought to simulate these dynamics in
various ways. Mitchell & Byrne, supra note 105, had student subjects read a sum-
marized transcript of an actual criminal trial and indicate their certainty of the
defendant's guilt and the amount of punishment he should receive. Thibaut, Walker
& Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decision Making, 86 HARV. L. REv.
386 (1972), and Walker, Thibaut & Andreoli, Order of Presentation at Trials, 82
YALE L.J. 216 (1972), had experimental assistants, representing prosecution and de-
fense attorneys, read the facts of a simulated case to student subjects who then
rendered a verdict. R. SIMON, supra note 49, presented her subjects, who were drawn
from local jury pools and ordered to participate in the experiment by a local judge,
with a 60 to 90 minute tape-recording recreating an actual trial. The subjects ren-
dered an individual and a group verdict and reported the group verdict to the judge,
who had stressed to them the importance of their participation in the experiment. P.
Legant, supra note 105, modified Simon's procedure by using a video-tape recording
and conducting the simulated trial sessions in a law school courtroom. See also
Legant, supra note 60, at 33-35.
Perhaps the most significant defect in all of these simulations of an actual trial
is the fact that the simulated jurors know that their verdict does not have any
consequence for an actual defendant. Perhaps the best that can be done, short of
hoaxing subjects into believing that their verdict will have some real effect on the
case they are deciding, is to emphasize to simulated jurors the importance of their
performance, stressing its effect on future reforms of the trial process. The extent
of the contribution social psychologists can make to an understanding of jury behavior
and trial dynamics will depend in great part on their success in recreating the ju-
dicial setting and on the generalizability of their research findings.
149. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
150. Id. at 1135-36.
151. Id. at 1136-37. See also Kadish & Kadish, supra note 38.
152. 473 F.2d at 1138-44.
153. Id. at 1140 n.5, 1141. See also United States v. Eichberg, 439 F.2d 620, 623-25
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
154. 473 F.2d at 1143.
155. See § II.B & note 55 supra.
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as an authority figure on the way the jurors perceive their own roles, 150
an instruction which informed the jury of its power of nullification
but at the same time conveyed the legal system's expectation that it
follow the general law in reaching its verdict would likely retain the
necessary tension in the jury's role. 1'3
A second question concerns a jury's erstwhile discretion to impose
the death penalty. In Furman v. Georgia"58 five Justices found that
the death penalty was cruel and unusual because, among other things,
its application was likely the result of racial discrimination; 1 9 it was
imposed by juries operating without legislative standards;1 60 and it
was, like lightning, arbitrary in striking a target. 1' While the model
suggested by this Note cannot answer the ultimate question of Eighth
Amendment violation, 0 2 it does have a bearing on some of the types
of questions the Court might ask in reaching its decision.
Social psychological research suggests that jurors are highly mo-
tivated to apply shared notions of equity in evaluating the seriousness
of an offense and in deciding whether the death penalty is appropriate
in the particular case. 163 It is at odds with the lightning metaphor of
Justice Stewart,0 4 hypothesizing instead that the jury has reacted in
accord with shared community values.' 6 The fact that the Court, at
a later time, without the benefit of direct observation of the trial and
without going through the same decisionmaking process as a jury,
156. See § II.B supra.
157. See pp. 1029-30 & note 38 supra.
158. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
159. Id. at 364-65 (Marshall, J., concurring); cf. id. at 249-53 (Douglas, J., concurring).
160. See, e.g., id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
161. "These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). The
Justices do not necessarily confine their major criticisms to the arbitrariness of juries.
Justice Brennan. for example, discussed data relating to postjury-verdict executions
as compared with commutations and resentences. Id. at 292-93.
162. Aside from the arguments reviewed in this section, the validity of the death
penalty might be evaluated differently on the basis of its character as a punishment,
cf. id. at 269-74 (Brennan, J., concurring), or its relationship to other legitimate ends
of the state, see, e.g., id. at 342-59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
163. Chief Justice Burger points out that the majority is willing to accept this
relationship between jury verdicts and community values, but only when the jury
has not imposed the death penalty. Id. at 387. See, e.g., id. at 279, 286 (Brennan,
J., concurring). At other times, infrequency of such a punishment is used to infer
arbitrariness. See, e.g., id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
164. See note 161 supra.
165. See note 163 supra. Justice White, concurring in the decision, determined that:
The short of it is that the policy of vesting sentencing authority primarily in
juries-a decision largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness of the
law and to bring community judgment to bear on the sentence as well as guilt
or innocence-has so effectively achieved its aims that capital punishment within
the confines of the statutes now before us has for all practical purposes run its
course.
408 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added).
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cannot always see the relationship between the penalty imposed and
community justice should not be very surprising. But these are all im-
portant elements in knowing whether the jury does in fact, as Justice
Stewart and others suggest, act arbitrarily.
There is the further question, however, whether and to what extent
certain of these shared notions, for example attractiveness, 166 hinge
on legally impermissible considerations, for example race. But inquiry
need not necessarily end there. If such elements are determinative or
substantially influential-albeit subconsciously-for individuals who
can be segregated through study of their shared notions with identifi-
able subclasses, 167 perhaps the problem can be eliminated during the
jury selection process. If legally impermissible considerations weigh
on the minds of otherwise acceptable and nonsegregatable jurors,
there is a further question to what extent, if at all, the considerations
may be overcome by appropriate judicial warning and instruction.0 8
The answers to the above questions would provide a greater step
toward solving the problem than deciding death penalty cases on the
basis of the existence of legislative standards.'6 9 Equity theory hypothe-
sizes that the jury's shared notions of equity in such cases are the very
notions which a legislature would rely on in working out useful guide-
lines for imposing the death penalty."70 The inference, that the deci-
sion of a jury having no legislative standards to "guide" it is arbi-
trary,' 71 or, conversely, that a jury having the benefits of legislative
standards will necessarily suppress all power of discretion, will likely
be proven invalid. Thus legislative standards for imposing capital pun-
166. See pp. 1046-47 supra.
167. See note 105 supra.
168. See § IILB supra. The basic question, therefore, e.g., in the case of ra-
cial prejudice of jurors, is whether such prejudice simply calls for more stringent
procedures or is inherently incapable of solution; cf. 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring). The issue, of course, is further
complicated to the extent that the problem is also one of pretrial selection for prose-
cution and post-trial commutations, etc. See note 161 supra. This discussion is con-
cerned solely with jury roles and not with all aspects of the death penalty controversy
as such.
169. The exact standards are not mentioned in the opinions, but seem to be those
discussed in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 247
(Douglas, J., concurring). In McGautha, the Court, upholding the right of a state
to rely on jury discretion rather than itself trying to set down specific standards,
referred to those factors discussed in the Model Penal Code and the Proposed Federal
Criminal Code of the Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. 402 U.S. at
205-08. The Model Code and the Commission's Final Report are discussed at p. 1045
supra; see also a suggestion for a "sentencing calculus" in Frankel, supra note 127, at
41-48.
170. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring); id. at 388-89
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 205-08 (1971). See
generally § II supra.
171. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ishment are a dubious improvement, as Justice Harlan noted in
McGautha v. California,172 since in such a serious matter they may be
resisted by juries where they significantly deviated from the jury's
own sense of justice.' 73
Out of a desire to severely restrict possible imposition of the death
penalty, the Court might mean, when referring to "legislative stand-
ards," mandatory sentencing statutes for certain classes of acts.174 But
even when faced with such statutes, a jury can exercise its sense of
equity by the finding or not of guilt. 7Y This realization again raises
the earlier question whether the jury ought not, in such circumstances,
be instructed as to its powers of nullification. 1 6
Conclusion
Protecting jury sovereignty may be the legal system's answer to the
dilemma posed by often conflicting societal demands for general rules
of law as well as justice in the particular case. Social psychological
theories of equity and attribution of responsibility together suggest
relatively stable dimensions of the jury's commonly held sense of equity
and offer a research model for a more refined study of jury behavior.
The empirical data collected on the basis of this model can provide
policymakers with more reliable information and a coherent frame of
reference with which to decide where to expand, keep, or retract the
jury's role in the legal system.
172. 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971).
173. See pp. 1029-30 supra. See also note 175 infra.
174. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 307-08 (Stewart, J., concurring).
175. This was recognized by both sides in Furman. See 408 U.S. at 245 n.8, 247
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
176. See pp. 1050-52 supra.
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